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要旨:
The emergence of the evolutionary game on complex networks provides a fresh framework for studying cooperation behavior between complex populations. Numerous recent progress has been achieved in studying asymmetric games. However, there is still a substantial need to address how to flexibly express the individual asymmetric nature. In this paper, we employ mutual cognition among individuals to elucidate the asymmetry inherent in their interactions. Cognition arises from individuals’ subjective assessments and significantly influences their decision-making processes. In social networks, mutual cognition among individuals is a persistent phenomenon and frequently displays heterogeneity as the influence of their interactions. This unequal cognitive dynamic will, in turn, influence the interactions, culminating in asymmetric outcomes. To better illustrate the inter-individual cognition in asymmetric snowdrift games, the concept of favor value is introduced here. On this basis, the evolution of cognition and its relationship with asymmetry degree are defined. In our simulation, we investigate how game cost and the intensity of individual cognitive changes impact the cooperation frequency. Furthermore, the temporal evolution of individual cognition and its variation under different parameters was also examined. The simulation results reveal that the emergence of heterogeneous cognition effectively addresses social dilemmas, with asymmetric interactions among individuals enhancing the propensity for cooperative choices. It is noteworthy that distinctions exist in the rules governing cooperation and cognitive evolution between regular networks and Watts–Strogatz small-world networks. In light of this, we deduce the relationship between cognition evolution and cooperative behavior in co-evolution and explore potential factors influencing cooperation within the system.
