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  Climate Policy Under National Commitments and Global Economic Shocks

Banerjee, A., Barbieri, S. (2025 online): Climate Policy Under National Commitments and Global Economic Shocks. - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 27, 3, e70032.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70032

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J Public Economic Theory - 2025 - Banerjee - Climate Policy Under National Commitments and Global Economic Shocks-1.pdf (Publisher version), 406KB
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J Public Economic Theory - 2025 - Banerjee - Climate Policy Under National Commitments and Global Economic Shocks-1.pdf
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 Creators:
Banerjee, Anwesha1, 2, Author              
Barbieri, Stefano3, Author
Affiliations:
1Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, ou_persistent13              
2Submitting Corresponding Author, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, ou_29970              
3External Organizations, ou_persistent22              

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Free keywords: climate protection | global income shocks | global warming | international public goods | option value
 Abstract: Global economic shocks may affect countries' Nash equilibrium contributions to emissions reduction efforts. We study the effect of income uncertainty on emissions reduction under different scenarios of national commitment targets. Our results show that in the presence of uncertainty, the framing of emissions reduction targets has implications for total emissions reduction and ex‐ante welfare. Under the plausible assumption of “prudence,” higher global uncertainty tends to reduce equilibrium climate contributions if countries commit to a fixed cap for damage reductions before the income uncertainty is resolved. In contrast, if countries are committed to allocating a proportion of income to climate protection, ex‐ante welfare may be higher than in the baseline case of no commitments.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2024-10-012025-04-102025-04-30
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 15
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70032
Organisational keyword: RD5 - Climate Economics and Policy - MCC Berlin
Organisational keyword: FutureLab - Ceres
PIKDOMAIN: RD5 - Climate Economics and Policy - MCC Berlin
Research topic keyword: Climate Policy
Research topic keyword: Economics
Regional keyword: Global
Model / method: Game Theory
MDB-ID: No data to archive
OATYPE: Hybrid - DEAL Wiley
 Degree: -

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Title: Journal of Public Economic Theory
Source Genre: Journal, SCI, Scopus
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 27 (3) Sequence Number: e70032 Start / End Page: - Identifier: CoNE: https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/cone/journals/resource/journal-public-economic-theory
Publisher: Wiley