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## The decarbonisation of Europe powered by lifestyle changes

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# The decarbonisation of Europe powered by lifestyle changes

Luís Costa<sup>1</sup>, Vincent Moreau<sup>2</sup>, Boris Thurm<sup>2</sup>, Wusheng Yu<sup>4</sup>, Francesco Clora<sup>4</sup>, Gino Baudry<sup>5</sup>, Hannes Warmuth<sup>6</sup>, Bernd Hezel<sup>1,7</sup>, Tobias Seydewitz<sup>1</sup>, Ana Ranković<sup>8</sup>, Garret Kelly<sup>8</sup> and Jürgen P. Kropp<sup>1,3</sup>

1 - Climate Resilience, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, Germany

2 - Laboratory of Environmental and Urban Economics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne, Switzerland

3 - Institute for Environmental Science and Geography, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany

4 - Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

5 - Faculty of Natural Sciences, Imperial College London, London, United Kingdom

6 - Energy Department, Austrian Society for Environment and Technology, Vienna, Austria

7 - Climate Media Factory, Potsdam, Germany.

8 - SEE Change Net Foundation, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

## Abstract

Decision makers increasingly recognize the importance of lifestyle changes in reaching low emission targets. How the mitigation potential of changes in mobility, dietary, housing or consumption behaviour compare to those of ambitious technological changes in terms of decarbonisation remains a key question. To evaluate the interplay of behaviour and technological changes, we make use of the European Calculator (EUCalc) model and show that changes in behaviour may contribute more than 20% of the overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions required for net-zero by 2050. Behaviour and technology-oriented scenarios are tested individually and in combination for the EU plus the UK and Switzerland. The impacts of behavioural change vary across sectors, with significant GHG emission reduction potential and broader benefits. Changes in travel behaviour limit the rising demand for electricity, natural resources and infrastructure costs from the electrification of passenger transport. Adopting a healthy diet reduces emissions substantially compared to intensifying agricultural practices, while at the same time making cropland available for conservation or bioenergy crops. The trade-offs between energy and food may be substantially alleviated when deploying technological and behavioural changes simultaneously. The results suggest that without behavioural change, the dependency of Europe on carbon removal technologies for its net-zero ambitions increases. Structural changes will be necessary to achieve full decarbonisation by 2050, yet changes in lifestyles are crucial, contributing to achieving climate targets sooner.

**Keywords:** Emission reductions, Lifestyles, Technology, Trade-offs, EUCalc

## 1. Introduction

Policy makers increasingly recognize that achieving low-carbon pathways requires some degree of societal change in addition to technological and policy measures (European Commission 2018a). Such societal changes are often framed under the term sustainable lifestyles (Evans and Abrahamse 2009). However, the literature has focused on providing comprehensive economic, policy and technology instruments for decarbonisation (Luderer *et al* 2013, Grubler *et al* 2018, Edenhofer *et al* 2014). Yet, the profile of demand-based solutions for mitigation is now sharpening (Creutzig *et al* 2018), and the role of lifestyle changes is moving from the fringes of the climate debate to occupy a more central role. Underpinning this shift is emerging research on the abatement potential of lifestyle-related changes in mobility, housing, diet and overall consumption (van de Ven *et al* 2018, Springmann *et al* 2016, Vita *et al* 2019, Ivanova *et al* 2020). While the mitigation potential from lifestyle changes has been reported to be broadly complementary to that brought by efficient and clean technologies (van Sluisveld *et al* 2016), a multi-sectoral investigation of the interlinkages between infrastructure, technology, investments and behavioural changes remain underexplored, especially in the context of rapid technological advances.

In this article, the authors report the abatement potential of lifestyle changes throughout the production, consumption, energy and land systems by investigating behavioural and technological changes both independently and simultaneously. *Lifestyles* can be defined as “clusters of habits and patterns of behaviour embedded in a society and facilitated by institutions, norms and infrastructures that frame individual choice” (Akenji and Chen 2016). Accordingly, changes in lifestyles are often an umbrella term for changes in both individual behaviour and related changes in technology and infrastructure. The boundary between what constitutes changes in behaviour and technology can be blurry as the latter influences many of the former, such as automobility. As explained recently by Saujot *et al* (2020) quantifying the impacts of lifestyle changes alone in mitigation pathways is no simple tasks. The authors innovate by accounting specifically for behavioural and/or technological changes, and integrating lifestyles from the very beginning of the modelling exercise.

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3 To evaluate this interplay between behavioural and technological changes, the European  
4 Calculator (EUCalc<sup>1</sup>) was used. The model runs at an intermediate level of complexity to  
5 facilitate the evaluation of trade-offs and synergies arising from changes in multiple sectors (e.g.  
6 households, transport, agriculture, etc.). Moreover, the model accounts for individual behaviour  
7 choices with varying levels of ambition, across 15 energy-relevant decisions including activities,  
8 goods and services (e.g., living space, distance travelled, diet and food waste). The impacts of  
9 changes in any sector or activity are evaluated in socio-economic, emissions, land and resources  
10 terms. Simultaneously, multiple pathways in the adoption of over 50 sectoral technologies and  
11 changes in energy supply (e.g., increasing shares of district heating, changing nuclear capacity)  
12 can be selected. As a result, the EUCalc allows the investigation of behavioural and  
13 technological changes independently and in combination to isolate the persistent effect of  
14 lifestyle changes in GHG emission reductions. In addition to feedback on technology and fuels  
15 from behavioural change, the model's user interface – the Transition Pathways Explorer (TPE)  
16 (<http://tool.european-calculator.eu>) – allows users to visualize the GHG emissions, energy and  
17 resources consumption, as well as socio-economic impacts associated with individual actions.  
18 This also provides critical insights for policy and decision makers to steer structural changes,  
19 which enable and incentivize behavioural choices towards climate mitigation.  
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35 Making use of the versatility of the EUCalc model, three scenarios are simulated, with varying  
36 intensities of behavioural and technological changes. The authors then compare the sectoral  
37 GHG emissions due to behavioural or technological changes, before discussing how lifestyles  
38 changes can specifically contribute to reaching the EU's net-zero target.  
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## 44 **2. Methods**

45 The European Calculator models energy, resources, production and food systems at the  
46 European Union (EU) and member-state (MS) levels plus UK and Switzerland (EU27+2). The  
47 EUCalc runs on a yearly time span, but the outputs are computed using 5-year time steps  
48 between 2020 and 2050 to reduce computation time. The modelling approach was inspired by  
49 the family of so-called 2050 Calculators which were spearheaded by the call for more  
50 transparent approaches to address the challenge of reducing carbon emissions (MacKay 2009,  
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58 <sup>1</sup> [https://bitbucket.org/eucalcmodel/\\_interactions/src/master/](https://bitbucket.org/eucalcmodel/_interactions/src/master/)  
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3 Wright 2016). Calculators have been used in global and country-level assessments of  
4 decarbonisation potentials (Strapasson *et al* 2017, Berger *et al* 2020) and to capture public  
5 preferences for energy pathways (Demski *et al* 2017). A key defining feature of the Calculators is  
6 the use of so-called *levers*, representing potential changes towards decarbonisation across  
7 sectors, each of which can be set at different level of ambition. These *levers and levels* describe  
8 2020 to 2050 trajectories for both behavioural (e.g., time spent in front of a computer or dietary  
9 choices) and technologies (e.g., the fuel mix in passenger transport or the intensification of  
10 agricultural production), see full list of levers in Table 3 of the SI. Levels range on a continuous  
11 scale from 1 to 4 where level 1 is typically equivalent to the continuation of past trends and  
12 level 4 represents the transformation of societal norms and preferences and/or the deployment  
13 of disruptive technologies that reduce carbon emissions and energy consumption (see Table 1  
14 for a set of examples and SI section 1.2.1 for details on lever and level definition). The  
15 trajectories of activities, technologies or practices are inputs to the model from which the  
16 associated energy, emissions and resources are calculated.  
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29 Levels of ambition can be associated with the outcomes of particular sectoral policies at EU or  
30 Member-State level. For example, the lever “Building envelope” (Table 3 of the SI) can be  
31 related to the directive on the energy performance of buildings, which sets the minimum  
32 requirements for buildings and building components that are subject to major renovation  
33 (European Parliament 2010). Levers serve as inputs to the modules in Figure 1. This includes the  
34 installed capacity of renewable energy, as well as the energy consumption mix in buildings,  
35 transport and manufacturing sectors, which other models generate endogenously in response  
36 to energy demand, investment, carbon market price and technological change (Bauer *et al*  
37 2016, Krey *et al* 2019). We emphasise therefore that the EUCalc is driven by exogenous lever  
38 inputs that do not affect or contradict other model parameters.  
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## 48 2.1 Modular structure

49 As shown in Figure 1 **Error! Reference source not found.**, the EUCalc consists of 15 inter-  
50 dependent modules representing the supply and demand sides of activities, materials, energy  
51 and emissions, as well as different interfaces of the energy system with society and the  
52 environment. The lifestyle module drives the model by calling upon the other modules for  
53 activities, goods and services (Costa *et al* 2020). Emissions from the energy system are  
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converted in global warming potential via the emissions module to derive a consistent climate impact and account for the effects of mitigation actions within the EU27+2 (Price *et al* 2019). The impacts of trade between the EU27+2 and the rest of the world (RoW) as well as embodied emissions are modelled with a modified version of GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) in the Transboundary effects module (Clora and Yu 2020). Intra and extra EU27+2 trade dynamics was shown to have a significant impact on emissions, comparable with the territorial emissions of EU Member States (Costa and Moreau 2019). A description of each module, their main outputs and interlinkages is provided in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 of the SI.




Figure 1 - Main flows of energy, materials and emissions and sectoral connections in the EUCalc model

## 2.2 The EUCalc and the abatement potential of behavioural change

In models referencing standard economic theory – such as integrated assessment and general equilibrium models – consumption choices are endogenously determined by income and prices and hence they cannot easily reproduce and evaluate the effects of significant modifications in consumer behaviour conducive to climate change mitigation, because large behavioural changes can only be induced by drastic changes in income and/or prices or through *ad hoc* modifications of consumer preferences. Accordingly, the abatement potential of particular

behaviour changes might remain unknown as they are not easily implemented without resorting to a number of extra assumptions, such as high carbon tax levels that are deemed politically infeasible (Latka *et al* 2021). Attempts have been made to apply more flexible functional forms and/or to design *ad hoc* rules for more “realistic” behaviour changes (Yu *et al* 2004, Woltjer *et al* 2014, Ho *et al* 2020). However, the extent of behavioural changes remains limited by the underlying consumer preferences; in the latter case, *ad hoc* updates of consumer preferences need to be guided by “desired” behaviour changes. In the EUCalc model this is a core feature and both behavioural and technological changes can be imposed without being bound by the usual constraints of optimization models. This gives the model more flexibility to implement and evaluate a wider array of desirable behaviour changes, informing their possible contributions in net-zero pathways for Europe. Such changes are used in the EUCalc model for conducting policy simulations rather than a policy optimization strategy in order to capture a wider solution space for decarbonisation. Moving from optimization to simulation has also been followed by others (Lamontagne *et al* 2019). Such a direct approach can also be reconciled with recent research. For example, social identity was shown to motivate climate action, in addition to factors such as personal benefits and costs (Bamberg *et al* 2015). The heterogeneity in behaviour remains a challenge for established classes of models in accounting for broader lifestyle changes (van den Berg *et al* 2019).

The EUCalc introduces varying ambitions for key behavioural changes (simultaneously and individually) derived from a literature review (see complete list of references in Costa *et al* (2020)) and discussed through expert consultations (see SI section 1.2). Once the level of behavioural change is defined at the European level it is disaggregated to national values using the concepts of convergence and compression (see section 1.2.1 of the SI). For example, in every country meat consumption decreases linearly to comply with the healthy dietary guidelines reported by the WHO *et al* (2003) and WCRF (2007) by 2050. In contrast, residential floor area decreases in proportion to each country’s 2015 value until the EU27+2 reaches the decent standards of 37m<sup>2</sup>/cap as suggested in Rao and Min(2018). For countries below this level in 2015 residential floor area is allowed to increase. Changes in behaviour in the EUCalc affect activities including passenger transport demand (Francke and Visser 2015), food demand, residential floor space demand and cooling, appliances demand and use (Bucksch *et al* 2016),

packaging and paper demand (Moran *et al* 2020), see also additional references in Costa *et al* (2020). The model then tracks the effects in terms of materials energy and emissions throughout a tightly coupled energy system (see Figure 1).

### 2.3 Life, Tech and Tango scenarios

To investigate the contribution of lifestyle changes to Europe's mitigation efforts, three different configurations of the EUCalc model called *Life*, *Tech* and *Tango* are simulated (see Table 1). The scenarios explore the potential of ambitious behavioural change; of rapid technological change; and the combined emission abatement of both technological and behavioural change in addition to that reported in the *LTS Baseline* (European Commission 2018b) - the EU's scenario to evaluate current policies on energy and emissions.

In the *Life* configuration, the ambition levels of individual behaviours are raised from those representing the *LTS Baseline* (see section 2.1 of the SI) to the maximum level assumed in the EUCalc (see Table 12 in the SI for all lever levels). This essentially means smarter and more selective consumption of products and energy services as found in the literature and discussed in stakeholder interaction (see SI section 1.2.1). The ambition levels related to Technology and fuels remain unchanged in the *Life* scenario, and correspond to the *LTS Baseline*. Changes in resources and land are made in favour of achieving the maximum feasible agroecology standards in crop and livestock production as well as the sustainable management of forests. In addition, land freed from agricultural production is dedicated to forest while bioenergy capacity is capped at LTS Baseline level.

Table 1 – Summary specifications of the scenarios investigated and relevant assumptions and average key indicators in the EU27+2 by 2050. Full scenario settings can be accessed via the EUCalc's web interface - the Transition pathways Explorer (TPE).

	<b>Life</b>	<b>Tech</b>	<b>Tango</b>
	Individual behaviour set to level 4 and technology deployment to LTS-Baseline.	Technology and fuels are set to level 4 and individual behaviour to LTS-Baseline.	Both individual behaviour and technology levers set to maximum ambition
Behaviour	<i>Passenger distance</i>	11520 pkm/cap/year	*15120 pkm/cap/year
	<i>Computer</i>	1.3/household	*2.5/household
	<i>Cooled living space</i>	10.6%	*21.8%
	<i>Meat in diet</i>	81 kcal/cap/day	*276 kcal/cap/day



Technology	Zero-emission vehicles	*46% of new car sales	100% of new car sales	
	Appliances efficiency	*65% improvement	89% improvement	
	Renovation rate	*1.3%/year	3%/year	
	Material switch	*concrete by timber in buildings 10%	concrete by timber in buildings 60%	
Energy and CCS		No CCS and nuclear power capped at LTS Baseline level	CCS deployed and nuclear power further increases	
	CC in energy	*0%	80%	
	CC in steel	*0%	40%	
	Nuclear capacity	*90GW	100GW	
		Renewable energy balanced to meet specific demand. Power oversupply capped at < 50% of the annual storage capacity		
Resources and land		Agriculture systems adopt agroecology standards	Agriculture systems are further intensified	
	Synthetic fertilizer use	0 kg/ha	200 kg/ha	Same as the Life scenario
	Animal based products wastes & losses	0.9%	5.2%	
	Freed land to forest	100%	0%	
Other		Population, urbanization and EU trade are kept roughly at LTS-Baseline levels		
	Population	*538.4 Millions		
	Urban population	*75.7%		
	Product manufacturing	*12% Net import/demand ratio		
Lever settings in the TPE**		<a href="#">link</a>	<a href="#">link</a>	<a href="#">link</a>

\* Best match of inputs in the EUCalc to those of the LTS-Baseline (see also section 2.1 of the SI). The reader can observe how different the Life, Tech and Tango are from the LTS Baseline by comparing the values in the same row.

\*\* The parametrization for the Life, Tech and Tango scenarios (as well as the LTS-Baseline) can be obtained from the drop-down menu in the EUCalc's web-interface: <http://tool.european-calculator.eu>

In the *Tech* scenario, levers related to individual behaviours are kept at *LTS Baseline* while those related to Technology and fuels are set to higher ambition levels as found to be technically feasible. For example, the renovation rate of buildings increases to 3% per year, the ambition required to renovate the majority of the buildings between today and 2050 (European Commission 2018a), and Zero Emission Vehicle reach 100% of car passenger sales in 2050. The exceptions are levers setting renewable energy capacities in Europe that do not increase substantially beyond the *LTS Baseline*, otherwise it would lead to an oversupply of electricity due to large gains in efficiency assumed in transport, buildings and manufacturing sectors. Crop and livestock production systems explore all the potential for further intensification.

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3 Lastly, in the *Tango* scenario, both behavioural and technological changes are combined. In this  
4 configuration, behaviour related levers are increased to the maximum ambition levels. The  
5 same takes place for resources, land and technology and fuels, while power generation is  
6 balanced to avoid oversupply. For all scenarios the settings on demographics and domestic  
7 supply dimensions of the EU27+2 (see Table 1) are kept at the *LTS Baseline* levels.  
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12 Simulating other scenarios to understand the system dynamics in the model can be done  
13 through the TPE (<http://tool.european-calculator.eu>). This web interface to the EUCalc model  
14 allowing users to swiftly visualize model outputs, highlight inter-sectoral synergies, and explore  
15 a broad range of decarbonisation options (Hezel *et al* 2019). Full scenarios settings and results  
16 can be accessed via TPE, see the provided links in Table 1.  
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### 23 3. Results

24 Results from the *Life* and *Tech* scenarios show that changes in individual behaviour alone can  
25 bring substantial reductions in GHG emissions by 2050 in addition to those of the *LTS Baseline*,  
26 see Table 2. This is particularly visible in the agriculture, power and transport sectors. Model  
27 outputs supporting this paper are made available at DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4450345  
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32 Changes represented in the *Life* scenario would lead to a 43% reduction in GHG emissions in the  
33 EU27+2 in 2050 given technological developments foreseen in the *LTS Baseline*. By 2050, GHG  
34 emissions in EU27+2 are circa 2280 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq under the EUCalc's reproduction of the *LTS*  
35 *Baseline* scenario. The sectoral reductions highlight the role of behavioural change vs  
36 technology. While GHG savings in the agriculture sector under the *Tech* scenario are marginal  
37 compared to the *LTS Baseline*, they are substantial in the *Life* scenario. In transport the  
38 additional reductions in the *Life* scenario are similar in magnitude to those observed for the  
39 *Tech* scenario.  
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48 Table 2 – Additional GHG reductions (without negative emissions) in 2050 to those of the *LTS Baseline* (in %).

Sector	Life	Tech
Agriculture	53.3	6.4
Buildings	11.8	65.6
Manufacturing	26.7	54.7
Power	82.2	89.8
Transport	48.4	76.4

EU27+2	42.9 (1304 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq)	58.7 (943 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq)
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In the case of buildings, the low reductions under the *Life* scenario shows that some of the emission benefits of individual behaviour in homes are reflected in other sectors. For example decrease use of household appliances reduces demand for electricity and hence emissions in the power sector; smaller living spaces require lower material use which reduces emissions in the manufacturing sector. The implications of the scenarios are discussed for each sector, emphasizing the multiple benefits of lifestyles changes.

### 3.1 The transport sector

Changes in travel behaviour are expected to result in large emission reductions. The *Life* scenario leads to GHG emission reductions of circa 220 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq in passenger transport and 110 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq in freight (see Figure 2). Again, this is with technology levers set according to the *LTS Baseline*. In comparison, the *Tech* scenario reduces emissions by circa 280 and 220 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq for passenger and freight transport respectively. By changing an individual behaviour or technology from *Life/Tech* setting to the *LTS Baseline* setting (while keeping all the other settings unchanged) the EU Calc allows for a breakdown of abatement potentials, see dashed line in Figure 2. Because of the independence of lever trajectories, the full mitigation potential of behavioural changes in transport is the sum of the contributions of the individual levers. What changes is the relative contribution of each lever depending on the order in which the levers are set. This is ultimately a societal choice and multiple combinations are possible, hence the individual shares reported in Figure 2 are only an example in which we sequentially assume decreasing passenger distance, followed by lower car ownership, followed by an increased occupancy and finally shifting transportation mode.

Increasing the share of public transportation for trains and buses to 18.5 and 17.3% respectively and increasing the occupancy of cars and buses to 2.6 and 27.2 persons/vehicle respectively in the *Life* scenario (see levers passenger modal and occupancy in Taylor *et al* (2019)), would result in emission reductions slightly larger than those expected from vehicle efficiency gains in the *Tech* scenario (where the energy consumption of cars, buses, train and planes decreases respectively by 50%, 30%, 45% and 30%, see Taylor *et al* (2019)). In the case of freight transport, a 22% reductions of freight demand (in tonne-km) due to reduced consumption and sourcing

products locally, can accommodate technological shifts and associated GHG emission savings with 50% of new truck sales being battery/catenary electric and 50% fuel cell by 2050.




Figure 2 - Transport GHG emissions reduction in 2050 in the *Life* and *Tech* scenarios compared to *LTS Baseline*. Dashed lines indicate the individual contribution of particular levers.

Reducing passenger and freight transport emissions in the *Tech* scenario, amid rising demand for travel, requires substantial electrification of the transport fleet. This is already the case in the *LTS Baseline* scenario (see Figure 3A) with demand from passenger transport peaking at circa 300 TWh in 2050. Given that in the *Life* scenario vehicle technology is kept at the *LTS Baseline*, their respective electricity demand curves almost coincide up to 2035 (see SI section 2.1 *Passenger technology* lever). In the long run, however, shorter travel distance, higher utilization and occupancy rates of vehicles curb the demand for electricity to below 180 TWh between 2035 and 2050. Improvements in vehicle efficiency in the *Tech* scenario (absent in the *Life* scenario) cannot compensate for the rising electricity demand, driven by longer travel distances and higher shares of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs). As a result, electricity demand grows to about 460 TWh in 2050.




Figure 3 - Electricity demand (A) and investments (B) in passenger transport for the evaluated scenarios.

Figure 3B shows the associated private costs (vehicle and fuel purchases) and public investment (buses, trains, infrastructure and fuel). For both scenarios, private costs and public investment are expected to run lower than the *LTS Baseline*. In the *Life* scenario, the drop in private household costs is driven mostly by fewer vehicles purchases and lower (fossil) fuel costs from declining travel demand. On one hand, the high penetration of ZEVs in the *Tech* scenario means (fossil) fuel costs are expected to constitute about 36% of those in the *Life* scenario in 2050. On the other hand, the investment costs for vehicle purchases in the *Tech* scenario nearly double (192%) compare to those in *Life* in 2050. Moreover, public investment in the *Tech* scenario run consistently higher than that in the *LTS Baseline*, driven by investments in infrastructure which more than double by 2050 compared to 2020. In the *Life* scenario investment exceeds the *LTS Baseline* between the 2030 and 2035 due to increased procurement of trains and buses. Infrastructure investment also grows in the *Life* scenario but at a slower pace (153% higher in 2050 than in 2020) than in *Tech*. As a result, from 2040 onwards, public investment in the *Life* scenario remains below the *LTS Baseline*. New vehicles and infrastructures not only mean new investments but also additional materials such as minerals and metals. Changes in the demand for aluminium, lithium, nickel and copper in the EU27+2 are very different whether the transport sector follows the *Life* or *Tech* scenario (see section 3 and Figure 47 of the SI). Demand for minerals and metals in the *Tech* scenario is expected to be 100 to 220% higher than in the *LTS Baseline*, compared to circa 50% lower in the *Life* scenario.

### 3.2 The agriculture sector

Dietary changes are increasingly seen as paramount in reducing the overall GHG emissions and the resource footprint of agricultural systems. The interlinkages in the EUCalc model between calorie demand for human consumption, agricultural practices, land-use and the carbon cycle, allow for the evaluation of the agricultural sector's role as an integral part of the EU's decarbonisation strategy.




Figure 4 - Contributions of behavioural change and agricultural practices in GHG emissions (A) and agricultural-land and water consumption (B) in the EU27+2. Black line show historical 1990-2015 emissions. Simulation period starts in 2020.

The generalized adoption of healthy diets as recommended by the WHO *et al* (2003) as well as less food waste, and a move towards agroecology practices would result in GHG emissions of circa 190 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq in 2050 in the *Life* scenario (see Figure 4A). This is a 53% reduction compared to the *LTS Baseline* and a further 18% less than agricultural emissions reported in the *LTS 1.5 LIFE* scenario for 2050 (European Commission 2018b) – the most ambitious in terms of dietary and agricultural practices of the LTS report. Changes in individual behaviour regarding dietary preferences results in the largest GHG saving in the agricultural sector accounting for approximately 71% of total emission reduction potential in 2050 (see Figure 4A). That said there are also savings due to a reduction in food waste and the adoption of agroecology practices. More importantly, without dietary shifts, moving towards agroecology alone (see blue line Figure 4A) will only yield a small decrease in GHG emissions. In fact, the abatement potential of

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3 agroecology without dietary shifts is marginally better than that of the *Tech* scenario in which  
4 agricultural systems are further intensified.  
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7 Approximately 45% of agricultural land (35% of cropland) can be freed up by adopting healthier  
8 diets, in particular less meat and dairy, as in the *Life* scenario, compared to the *LTS Baseline* (see  
9 Figure 4B). Cropland alone – circa 34.5 Mha (about the area of Finland) – indicates that the  
10 production of food for healthily nourishing the growing population in EU27+2 can co-exist with  
11 other uses such as conservation or the production of energy crops. At the global level, large-  
12 scale bioenergy production of 300 EJ from ambitious climate mitigation targets would require  
13 an area of 636 Mha for bioenergy crops. This represents 38% of current global cropland  
14 (Humpenöder *et al* 2018) and, in relative terms, compares to the share of cropland freed in  
15 Europe due to dietary changes in the *Life* scenario. Two comprehensive reviews estimated the  
16 2050 European bioenergy demand and land requirement for energy crops at 3 to 56 EJyr<sup>-1</sup> and  
17 13 to 33 Mha respectively (Ovando and Caparrós 2009, Bentsen and Felby 2012). Thus, in terms  
18 of area alone, freed cropland in the *Life* scenario could contribute to bioenergy production  
19 without interfering with food production. By default, the *Life* scenario allocates freed-up land to  
20 forests in order to enhance carbon storage (see lever land management SI section 2.1). The long  
21 standing conflict between land use for food/feed and energy crops (Popp *et al* 2014), can  
22 therefore be formulated as a trade-off between sustaining current excess food  
23 consumption/waste and having the opportunity for bioenergy and biodiversity.  
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### 40 3.3 The power sector

41 GHG emissions from the power sector are projected to fall by 98% in 2050 with respect to 2015,  
42 to just over 20 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq in the case of the *Tech* scenario (see Figure 5 main). During the same  
43 period, the *Life* scenario results in circa 96% reduction, albeit at a slower pace, meaning that by  
44 2050 an additional 2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq would be emitted compared to the *Tech* scenario. This is partly  
45 due to the absence of carbon capture (CC) in the technologies portfolio of the power generation  
46 sector in the *Life* scenario. Nevertheless, changes in behaviour accelerate the decarbonisation of  
47 the power sector since the emission reduction in the *LTS Baseline* is 74 % between 2015 and  
48 2050 (see also section 2.1, *Power levers*, of the SI).  
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


Figure 5 - GHG emission in the power sector under the *Life*, *Tech* and *Tango w/o NucCCS* configurations (main). Cumulative emissions of curtailing nuclear power and additional GHG savings in transport and agriculture sectors due to lifestyle changes (inset).

The EUCalc results stress the imperative of phasing out coal by the end of the 2020s as shown by others (Rockström *et al* 2017). The continued phasing out of coal use would dominate emission reductions between 2020 and 2025 and account for 50 to 65% of the total GHG emission reduction in the power sector by 2050 for the *Life* and *Tech* scenarios respectively.

In both *Life* and *Tech* scenarios, nuclear capacities remain substantial, respectively at 90 and 101 GW, while CCS is deployed to its full technical potential in the *Tech* scenario. These options are seen as particularly divisive in the public opinion in regard to their role in climate change mitigation (Abdulla *et al* 2019). The EUCalc allows testing the GHG consequences of a future in which these technologies are scaled down or not deployed. To do so the *Tango* scenario – which combines the highest decarbonisation ambitions of the *Life* and *Tech* (see Table 1) – can be tweaked so that nuclear power capacity is scaled down to 11 GW by 2050 and carbon capture and storage for fossil fuel electricity generation is not deployed.

The GHG implications of *Tango w/o NucCCS* are visible in the sudden jump in 2030 as coal phase-out is largely completed and nuclear goes offline. The loss in production is then



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3 compensated by natural gas generation (see section 3 and Figure 48 of the SI). As in Bauer *et al*  
4 (2012), decommissioning nuclear power might come at the expense of more emissions from the  
5 power sector, either because equivalent renewable capacities cannot be deployed within 5  
6 years or as reserves to account for their intermittency. By 2050 this would imply an additional 6  
7 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq compared to the *Tech* scenario in the EU27+2 (see grey area of Figure 5 main and  
8 inset). However, it should be noted that the original *Tango* scenario accounts for all behavioural  
9 changes in the *Life* scenario and all ambitious technical improvements in the *Tech* scenario.  
10 These synergistic reductions in GHG emissions, attributable to lifestyles changes, save an  
11 additional 3.1 and 3.2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq in the agriculture and transport sectors respectively between  
12 2020 and 2050 (see inset in Figure 5). These emission savings would be enough to compensate  
13 the loss of abatement from nuclear power.  
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16 Cumulative and non-discounted investment in power generation associated with the *Tango w/o*  
17 *NucCCS* scenario between 2020 and 2050 are about 10% lower than the ones obtained under  
18 the *LTS Baseline*. The difference is mostly driven by a substantial drop in operational (OPEX) and  
19 capital expenditures (CAPEX) of nuclear (see section 3 and Figure 49 of the SI). OPEX in gas  
20 generation is above the *LTS Baseline* and the highest among all considered scenarios. By  
21 contrast, cumulative investment in the *Tech* scenario would be 50% higher than that in the *LTS*  
22 *Baseline* and driven mostly by CAPEX for new offshore wind capacity and CCS.  
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### 24 3.4 EU27+2

25 Figure 6 summarizes the GHG emissions of the *Tango* scenario, highlighting the share of  
26 reductions associated with behavioural change and technological development. Note that  
27 because the order in which levers are set matters for their relative contribution to total  
28 reductions (see also results for Figure 2), the main panel of Figure 6 reports only the  
29 contribution of behavioural change in case technology deployment is prioritized. Therefore, this  
30 is a lower bound of the potential contribution of behavioural changes to the decarbonisation of  
31 the EU27+2. Should behavioural changes be prioritized, their full potential would be closer to  
32 60% reduction in emissions by 2050, as shown in the inset of Figure 6.  
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35 The *Tango* scenario would make it possible for the EU27+2 to reach net-zero by approximately  
36 2040 (see intersection of the magenta lines in Figure 6). Between 2025 and 2050 the  
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contribution of behaviour change to GHG emission reductions remains small but persistent, averaging circa 20% of potential reductions in the most ambitious *Tango* scenario (see inset of Figure 6). These reductions have important effects on the timing for reaching key climate targets. Without the behavioural reduction wedge, GHG emissions would be 16% higher in 2040 and the negative emissions from land-use due to dietary change would decline (that is, fewer removals) to about 40% of the *Tango* potential. As a result, achieving net-zero would be postponed to 2050. In the *LTS Baseline* scenario (orange line in Figure 6), the 55% reductions target by 2030 of the European Commission's Green Deal would be reached by 2043 while in the *Life* scenario (which incorporates the technological development of the *LTS Baseline*) the target would be reached by 2035.




Figure 6 - The role of behaviour and technological changes in the decarbonisation of the EU27+2. Black lines show historical 1990-2015 GHG emissions and negative emission from land-use. Negative emissions are plotted in an absolute scale. Inset shows the range of % of reductions associated with behavioural change in reaching net-zero. Simulation period starts in 2020.

The technology and fuels wedge provides the largest share of potential emission reductions, emphasizing the need for structural changes in all sectors. Yet, changes in behaviour- as described in this paper - provides the EU27+2 with an important opportunity to avoid high cost and/or high risk technologies in pursuit of decarbonisation. Net-zero would still be technically

feasible by 2050 even in the absence of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) as long as the decarbonisation wedge from the *Life* scenario is realized (see Figure 6). Without behavioural change, the EU27+2 would require carbon removal and storage of 6.3 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq between 2020 and 2050. Although this value is higher than in the *LTS 1.5 scenarios* reaching net-zero (European Commission 2018b), it is below estimates of the role of BECCS in Europe's energy sector (Solano Rodriguez *et al* 2017) and its territorial storage potential (Pozo *et al* 2020).

#### 4. Discussion

The definition of the *Life*, *Tech* and *Tango* scenarios are rooted in the *LTS Baseline* as they share important commonalities (see Table 1). It is therefore important to evaluate how closely the EUCalc model can reproduce the GHG evolution of EU's main benchmark scenario. After configuring EUCalc's inputs to match the evolution of activities, technologies, fuel mix and efficiencies found in the *LTS Baseline* scenario (see Section 2 and 2.1) we obtain a difference in total GHG emissions of +3.1% in the year 2050 (median of +8.3% over 2020 to 2050, see 2.2 and Table 11 of the SI for sectoral comparison) compared to those reported by the European Commission (2018a).

The ability to investigate scenarios of broad and deep behavioural change makes the EUCalc a suitable model to explore a world of increasing uncertainty. The SARS Cov-2 pandemic has shown that lifestyle changes can occur rapidly, albeit not entirely voluntarily, with significant emissions reductions over the short-term (Le Quéré *et al* 2020). When looking to the future it is impossible not to consider the long term socio-economic effects of changes in consumer behaviour introduced by the pandemic which are not expected to be short-lived (IEA 2020). We have observed that in the *Life* scenario, employment, measured in total working hours decreases in transport, industry, agriculture, and power sectors as individuals travel less, purchase less vehicles/appliances and consume less food, material and energy (see section 3 and Figure 51 of the SI). However, the monetary savings on energy, vehicle and food expenses means that more income can be allocated to service activities (e.g., local tourism and cultural activities). This increase compensates for the loss of employment in other sectors and in 2050, the *Life* scenario is neutral in employment terms, increasing overall employment by only 0.05%

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3 over that of the *LTS Baseline*. This also corroborates existing research on the employment  
4 impacts of energy transition, with a small but net positive effect (Füllemann *et al* 2019).  
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7 Finally, the tight sectoral integration of the EUCalc model allowed exposing a range of co-  
8 benefits associated with the *Life* scenario. This leads to lower pressure on natural resources  
9 such as water consumption (Figure 5) and mineral extraction (see Figure 47 of the SI). It also  
10 highlights the broader sustainability of trajectories towards net-zero emissions that incorporate  
11 a high degree of behavioural change.  
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## 16 17 **5. Conclusions**

18 The EUCalc model was used to evaluate the combined and individual role of ambitious  
19 behavioural and technological changes in Europe in reducing GHG emissions and reaching net-  
20 zero by 2050. In doing so we uncovered the existence of a limited but crucial role for  
21 behavioural change in alleviating three challenges surrounding the decarbonisation of Europe.  
22 Firstly, ambitious behavioural changes in combination with technological changes would allow  
23 for reaching net-zero targets by approximately 2040. The results emphasize the need to  
24 consider combined behavioural and technological changes in decarbonisation pathways  
25 because the former can deliver early emissions reductions, equivalent to lower hanging fruits  
26 than technological changes (see inset in Figure 6). Relying exclusively on technological changes  
27 for decarbonisation would likely push this target to around 2050. Secondly, because the  
28 mitigation potential of behavioural changes is in some cases equivalent (or even superior) to  
29 that of technologies/practices, decision makers can more clearly judge where to deploy the  
30 most ambitious policies. For example, the cross-sectoral mitigation potential associated with  
31 changes in behaviour was quantified as large as that expected from the large-scale deployment  
32 of BECCS, a divisive option among experts and the public opinion. Third, the over reliance on  
33 technology deployment as a cornerstone of Europe's climate ambitions limits the potential for  
34 broader co-benefits of decarbonisation. Europe's water consumption, land requirements and  
35 mineral demand are considerably reduced when behavioural changes are considered in the  
36 pathway towards net-zero. These insights and the underlying lifestyle and technological changes  
37 can then be explored further in policy-making to determine actionable economic and political  
38 priorities in achieving full decarbonisation.  
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