date: 2025-11-06T03:54:41Z
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pdf:docinfo:title: Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments?Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning
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subject: We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player's contribution on the contributions of others. We prove that the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincides exactly with the core of the underlying cooperative game. We further show that these core outcomes can be found via simple individual learning dynamics.
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dc:title: Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments?Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning
modified: 2025-11-06T03:54:41Z
cp:subject: We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player's contribution on the contributions of others. We prove that the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincides exactly with the core of the underlying cooperative game. We further show that these core outcomes can be found via simple individual learning dynamics.
pdf:docinfo:subject: We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player's contribution on the contributions of others. We prove that the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincides exactly with the core of the underlying cooperative game. We further show that these core outcomes can be found via simple individual learning dynamics.
pdf:docinfo:creator: Jobst Heitzig
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Creation-Date: 2025-11-06T03:06:43Z
Author: Jobst Heitzig
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Keywords: public good; conditional commitment; core of a game; strong equilibrium; learning in games; package deal
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dc:creator: Jobst Heitzig
dcterms:created: 2025-11-06T03:06:43Z
Last-Modified: 2025-11-06T03:54:41Z
dcterms:modified: 2025-11-06T03:54:41Z
title: Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments?Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning
Last-Save-Date: 2025-11-06T03:54:41Z
pdf:docinfo:keywords: public good; conditional commitment; core of a game; strong equilibrium; learning in games; package deal
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creator: Jobst Heitzig
dc:subject: public good; conditional commitment; core of a game; strong equilibrium; learning in games; package deal
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meta:keyword: public good; conditional commitment; core of a game; strong equilibrium; learning in games; package deal
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