Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation 
game and other repeated public good games

Heitzig, Jobst; Lessmann, K.; Zou, Y.

doi:10.1073/pnas.1106265108

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Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games

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Heitzig, Jobst
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research;

Lessmann, K.
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Cooperation Partners;

Zou, Y.
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Cooperation Partners;

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Heitzig, J., Lessmann, K., Zou, Y. (2011): Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games. - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), 108, 38, 15739-15744.
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1106265108

Cite as: https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/pubman/item/item_17117

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