Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional 
Commitments—Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning

Heitzig, Jobst

doi:10.3390/g16060058

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Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments—Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning

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Heitzig, Jobst
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research;
Submitting Corresponding Author, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research;

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Heitzig, J. (2025): Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments—Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning. - Games, 16, 6, 58.
https://doi.org/10.3390/g16060058

Cite as: https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/pubman/item/item_33565

Abstract

We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player’s contribution on the contributions of others. We prove that the set of strong Nash equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincides exactly with the core of the underlying cooperative game. We further show that these core outcomes can be found via simple individual learning dynamics.