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  Fair group decisions via non-deterministic proportional consensus

Heitzig, J., Simmons, F. W., Constantino, S. M. (2024 online): Fair group decisions via non-deterministic proportional consensus. - Social Choice and Welfare.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01524-3

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 Creators:
Heitzig, Jobst1, Author              
Simmons, Forest W.2, Author
Constantino, Sara M.2, Author
Affiliations:
1Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, ou_persistent13              
2External Organizations, ou_persistent22              

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 Abstract: Are there group decision methods which (i) give everyone, including minorities, an equal share of effective decision power even when voters act strategically, (ii) promote consensus and equality, rather than polarization and inequality, and (iii) do not favour the status quo or rely too much on chance? We describe two non-deterministic group decision methods that meet these criteria, one based on automatic bargaining over lotteries, the other on conditional commitments to approve compromise options. Using theoretical analysis, agent-based simulations and a behavioral experiment, we show that these methods prevent majorities from consistently suppressing minorities, which can happen in deterministic methods, and keeps proponents of the status quo from blocking decisions, as in other consensus-based approaches. Our simulations show that these methods achieve aggregate welfare comparable to common voting methods, while employing chance judiciously, and that the welfare costs of fairness and consensus are small compared to the inequality costs of majoritarianism. In an incentivized experiment with naive participants, we find that a sizable fraction of participants prefers to use a non-deterministic voting method over Plurality Voting to allocate monetary resources. However, this depends critically on their position within the group. Those in the majority show a strong preference for majoritarian voting methods.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2024-04-052024-05-04
 Publication Status: Published online
 Pages: 27
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01524-3
MDB-ID: yes - 3509
PIKDOMAIN: RD4 - Complexity Science
Organisational keyword: RD4 - Complexity Science
Organisational keyword: FutureLab - Game Theory & Networks of Interacting Agents
Research topic keyword: Economics
Research topic keyword: Inequality and Equity
Regional keyword: Global
Model / method: Agent-based Models
Model / method: Decision Theory
Model / method: Game Theory
Model / method: Open Source Software
OATYPE: Hybrid - DEAL Springer Nature
 Degree: -

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Title: Social Choice and Welfare
Source Genre: Journal, SSCI, Scopus
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: - Sequence Number: - Start / End Page: - Identifier: CoNE: https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/cone/journals/resource/1432-217X
Publisher: Springer