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  The climate rent curse: new challenges for burden sharing

Kornek, U., Steckel, J. C., Lessmann, K., Edenhofer, O. (2017): The climate rent curse: new challenges for burden sharing. - International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 17, 6, 855-882.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-017-9352-2

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 ???ViewItemFull_lblCreators???:
Kornek, Ulrike1, ???ENUM_CREATORROLE_AUTHOR???           
Steckel, Jan Christoph1, ???ENUM_CREATORROLE_AUTHOR???                 
Lessmann, Kai1, ???ENUM_CREATORROLE_AUTHOR???                 
Edenhofer, Ottmar1, ???ENUM_CREATORROLE_AUTHOR???                 
???ViewItemFull_lblAffiliations???:
1Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, ou_persistent13              

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 ???ViewItemFull_lblAbstract???: The literature on the “resource curse” has strongly emphasized that large incomes from resource endowments may have adverse effects on the growth prospects of a country. Conceivably the income generated from emission permit allocations, as suggested in the context of international climate policy, could have a comparable impact. Effects of a “climate rent curse” have so far not been considered in the design of permit allocation schemes. In this study, we first determine when to expect a climate rent curse conceptually by analyzing its potential channels. We then use a numerical model to explore the extent of consequences that a climate rent curse would have on international climate agreements. We show that given the susceptibility to a curse, permit allocation schemes may fail to encourage the participation of recipient countries in an international mitigation effort. We present transfer schemes that enhance cooperation and limit adverse effects on recipients.

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 ???ViewItemFull_lblDates???: 2017
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 ???ViewItemFull_lblIdentifiers???: ???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_DOI???: 10.1007/s10784-017-9352-2
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_PIKDOMAIN???: Sustainable Solutions - Research Domain III
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_EDOC???: 7567
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_RESEARCHTK???: Climate Policy
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_RESEARCHTK???: Carbon Pricing
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_RESEARCHTK???: Economics
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_RESEARCHTK???: Inequality and Equity
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_MODELMETHOD???: MICA
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_MODELMETHOD???: Game Theory
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_REGIONALK???: Global
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_ORGANISATIONALK???: RD3 - Transformation Pathways
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_PIKDOMAIN???: RD5 - Climate Economics and Policy - MCC Berlin
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_ORGANISATIONALK???: RD5 - Climate Economics and Policy - MCC Berlin
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_WORKINGGROUP???: Governance
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???ViewItemFull_lblSourceTitle???: International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
???ViewItemFull_lblSourceGenre???: ???ENUM_GENRE_JOURNAL???, SCI, Scopus
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???ViewItemFull_lblPages???: ???lbl_noEntry??? ???ViewItemFull_lblSourceVolumeIssue???: 17 (6) ???ViewItemFull_lblSourceSequenceNo???: ???lbl_noEntry??? ???ViewItemFull_lblSourceStartEndPage???: 855 - 882 ???ViewItemFull_lblSourceIdentifier???: ???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_OTHER???: Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_OTHER???: 1573-1553
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_ISSN???: 1567-9764
???ENUM_IDENTIFIERTYPE_CONE???: https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/cone/journals/resource/international-environmental-agreements