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  Make or brake - rich states in voluntary federal emission pricing

Roolfs, C., Gaitan, B., Edenhofer, O. (2021): Make or brake - rich states in voluntary federal emission pricing. - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 109, 102463.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102463

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Item Permalink: https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/pubman/item/item_25617 Version Permalink: https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/pubman/item/item_25617_3
Genre: Journal Article

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 Creators:
Roolfs, Christina1, Author              
Gaitan, Beatriz1, Author              
Edenhofer, Ottmar1, Author              
Affiliations:
1Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam, ou_persistent13              

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 Abstract: Voluntary participation can improve multilateral environmental governance. We model voluntary participation of states in unanimously approved federal environmental policy. A Pareto-improving federal emission price coexists with state-level emission pricing. Federal revenues are distributed equally per capita (egalitarian), in proportion to states' historical emission levels (sovereignty), or states’ actual payments (juste retour). We find that the existence of Pareto-improving uniform federal prices depends on wealth differences, transfer rules, and on whether or not states anticipate transfers. Sovereignty transfers work in all cases. Differences in wealth can undermine egalitarian transfers. Juste retour transfers render federal policy ineffective if states anticipate them. The richest state prefers the lowest Pareto-optimal federal price (“minimum price”) as it becomes the largest net-donor. Adding different population sizes, the richest and largest (smallest) state prefers the minimum price with sovereignty and juste retour transfers (egalitarian transfers). Therefore, rich states brake and simultaneously make possible passing unanimous federal policy.

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Language(s): eng - English
 Dates: 2021-03-292020-04-242021-04-212021-05-072021-06-25
 Publication Status: Finally published
 Pages: -
 Publishing info: -
 Table of Contents: -
 Rev. Type: Peer
 Identifiers: DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102463
PIKDOMAIN: RD3 - Transformation Pathways
Organisational keyword: RD3 - Transformation Pathways
PIKDOMAIN: Director / Executive Staff / Science & Society
Organisational keyword: Director Edenhofer
MDB-ID: No data to archive
Research topic keyword: Climate Policy
Research topic keyword: Carbon Pricing
Research topic keyword: Economics
Research topic keyword: Global Commons
Research topic keyword: Inequality and Equity
Regional keyword: Europe
Regional keyword: Global
 Degree: -

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Title: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Source Genre: Journal, SCI, Scopus
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Pages: - Volume / Issue: 109 Sequence Number: 102463 Start / End Page: - Identifier: Publisher: Elsevier
Other: 1096-0449
ISSN: 0095-0696
CoNE: https://publications.pik-potsdam.de/cone/journals/resource/journal-of-environmental-economics-and-management